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UNCONSTITUTIONAL MIXING OF RELIGION AND THE
JUDICIARY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUGITIVE SAFE
SURRENDER PROGRAM UNDER ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Jeffrey A. Gruen ∗
Fugitive safe surrender is a program of the United States Marshals Service, in partnership with public, private, and faith-based organizations,
which temporarily transforms a church into a courthouse, so fugitives
can turn themselves in, in an atmosphere where they feel more comfortable to
1
do so, and have nonviolent cases adjudicated immediately.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an effort to bolster public safety and capture fugitives, U.S.
Marshal for the Northern District of Ohio Peter Elliot created an in2
novative program called Fugitive Safe Surrender. This program
“temporarily transforms a church into a courthouse, so fugitives can
turn themselves in, in an atmosphere where they feel more comfort3
able to do so.” Elliot thought that fugitives would feel more comfortable surrendering at a church because it provides a safe environ-
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1
Fugitive Safe Surrender Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007)
(emphasis added).
2
Press Release, U.S. Marshals Service, Cleveland U.S. Marshal Named “Top
Cop” of the United States (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/
news/chron/2007/032807.htm [hereinafter March 28, 2007, U.S. Marshals Press Release]; see also U.S. Marshals Service, Fugitive Safe Surrender, http://www
.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter
Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview].
3
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1).
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4

ment that is not associated with violence. The pilot program in
Cleveland, Ohio, produced successful results, as over 800 fugitives
5
surrendered over a four-day period. Based on the pilot program’s
success, the U.S. Marshals Service revealed its plan to implement the
6
program nationally, and identical bills were introduced into the
House and Senate to provide federal funding for this innovative pro7
gram. The bills were passed as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act and provided federal funding to the U.S. Marshals
Service for any state implementing the program between 2007 and
8
2009.
While the goal of the program is commendable, it raises serious
issues under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
which prohibits Congress from making any law that respects an estab9
lishment of religion. The program is constitutionally suspect because it does not adhere to the separation of church and state doctrine.
The Supreme Court first examined separation of church and
10
state in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing and embraced strict separation of the two. Justice Black, writing for the majority, explained,
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or prac4

Phil Trexler, Inspiration Delivers Fugitives to Church: U.S. Marshal Gets Idea for Surrender Program, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL (Ohio), Apr. 2, 2007, at AK-0402.
5
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fugitive Safe Surrender Succeeds (Aug. 8,
2005), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/district/oh-n/news/chron/2005/
080805.htm [hereinafter Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release].
6
U.S. Marshals Service, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion,
http://www.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/expansion.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2008) [hereinafter Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion].
7
H.R. 5459, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2570, 109th Cong. (2006).
8
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 632, 120
Stat. 587, 641–42 (2006) (Fugitive Safe Surrender Act codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989
(West Supp. 2007)).
9
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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tice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
11
erect “a wall of separation between church and State.”

Over the past sixty years, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
12
evolved and become increasingly complex. However, the Supreme
Court has provided guidelines for analyzing claims of Establishment
13
Clause violations in the form of three tests: the Lemon test, the en14
15
dorsement test, and the coercion test.
This Comment argues that Fugitive Safe Surrender violates the
Establishment Clause under current jurisprudence and that the program should be offered in a non-sectarian environment so that its
tremendous benefits may be obtained through constitutional means.
Part II discusses the creation and funding of the program, its implementation in two different cities, and President Bush’s faith-based initiative, which demonstrates his desire to allow programs of this nature. Part III discusses the three main tests under Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and analyzes Fugitive Safe Surrender according
to those tests. Additionally, Part III discusses how those tests have
evolved and the role of public policy in Establishment Clause decisions. Finally, Part IV proposes reform for the program with an eye
toward maintaining separation of church and state.
II. THE CREATION OF THE FUGITIVE
SAFE SURRENDER PROGRAM
The concept of the church as a refuge for fugitives is not new.
Historically, sanctuaries served as places of refuge where fugitives
16
were safe from the penalties of the law. This concept was so accepted that it was considered sacrilegious to commence violence in
17
these safe havens or to forcibly remove an individual from them. In
11

Id. at 15–16 (citation omitted).
The split decisions in most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with Establishment Clause violations demonstrate the different views held by the Justices. See
generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000). In addition, these cases demonstrate that no test or factor has been established as the sole test to use in Establishment Clause cases but instead that several
considerations are considered under many levels of different tests.
13
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
14
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
15
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
16
THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2501 (6th ed. 2007).
17
Id.
12
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Egypt and Greece, temples enjoyed this hallowed status, and in
Rome, Christian churches were chosen as sanctuaries by Constantine
18
I. In medieval law, churches maintained sanctuary status, and felons
obtained a religious right of asylum should they safely reach such a
19
destination. English law recognized churches and temples as sanctuaries from the Fourth to the Seventeenth century, and once inside,
20
fugitives enjoyed the right to be safe from arrest. When abuses of
sanctuaries began to encourage crime, the notion of a safe haven was
abolished, and modern penal codes no longer recognize this right to
21
asylum for fugitives.
Today, the concept of the church as a sanctuary has resurfaced
in the form of the Fugitive Safe Surrender program, created by Peter
22
Elliot, U.S. Marshal for the Northern District of Ohio.
The U.S.
Marshals Service intends to implement the program nationally by
23
2009. The program “temporarily transforms a church into a court24
house” by placing state judges in churches to adjudicate non-violent

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
March 28, 2007, U.S. Marshals Press Release, supra note 2.
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(4), (c) (West Supp. 2007).
The Fugitive Safe Surrender Act reads in full:
(a) Findings. Congress finds the following:
(1) Fugitive Safe Surrender is a program of the United States
Marshals Service, in partnership with public, private, and faithbased organizations, which temporarily transforms a church into
a courthouse, so fugitives can turn themselves in, in an atmosphere where they feel more comfortable to do so, and have
nonviolent cases adjudicated immediately.
(2) In the 4-day pilot program in Cleveland, Ohio, over 800 fugitives turned themselves in. By contrast, a successful Fugitive
Task Force sweep, conducted for 3 days after Fugitive Safe Surrender, resulted in the arrest of 65 individuals.
(3) Fugitive Safe Surrender is safer for defendants, law enforcement, and innocent bystanders than needing to conduct a
sweep.
(4) Based upon the success of the pilot program, Fugitive Safe
Surrender should be expanded to other cities throughout the
United States.
(b) Establishment. The United States Marshals Service shall establish,
direct, and coordinate a program (to be known as the “Fugitive Safe
Surrender Program”), under which the United States Marshals Service
shall apprehend Federal, State, and local fugitives in a safe, secure, and
peaceful manner to be coordinated with law enforcement and community leaders in designated cities throughout the United States.
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cases in which the fugitives have no history of violence. Elliot and
other promoters of the program, such as U.S. Marshal for Arizona
David Gonzales, emphatically claim that the program is not an am26
nesty program. However, the fugitives do receive “favorable consid27
This includes release without bail,
eration” for surrendering.
28
quashed warrants, and lesser penalties at sentencing. The adjudication that takes place at the church includes meeting with judges, public defenders, and prosecutors; conducting arraignments, plea
29
agreements, and bond hearings; and setting dates for sentencing.
Finally, some of the programs have involved the use of priests acting
30
as advocates for the fugitives.
Elliot believes this program will benefit both the fugitives and
the community by providing an environment where fugitives feel
comfortable surrendering and by keeping fugitive arrests off the
31
streets.
In a recent interview, Elliot stressed the effectiveness of
comfort and trust as motivating factors for surrendering:
I’ve been in law enforcement 24 years and I didn’t feel the community trusted police for the most part. I felt the community

(c) Authorization of Appropriations. There are authorized to be appropriated to the United States Marshals Service to carry out this section-(1) $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2007;
(2) $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; and
(3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2009.
(d) Other Existing Applicable Law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit any existing authority under any other provision of
Federal or State law for law enforcement agencies to locate or apprehend fugitives through task forces or any other means.
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989.
25
See Troy Graham, High Court Blocks Plan for Camden Fugitives: The Chief Justice,
Citing Credibility and Safety, Won’t Let Judges Take Part in a Program for Criminals to Surrender in a Church, PHIL. INQ., Jul. 18, 2006, at B1.
26
Dennis Wagner & Lindsey Collom, Fugitives Answer Call to Surrender: Program
Gives Suspects Chance for “Favorable Consideration”, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2006, at 3A.
27
U.S. Marshals, Fugitive Safe Surrender, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ].
28
See Dennis Wagner, Arizona Fugitives Will Get to Surrender—In Church, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2006, at 1A; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26; WKYC News, Fugitive Safe Surrender: 33-Year-Old Man Becomes First to Turn Himself In (July 25,
2005), http://www.wkyc.com/news/news_fullstory.asp?id=38380.
29
See Wagner, supra note 28; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26; WKYC News, supra
note 28.
30
See Dick Russ, WKYC News, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Fugitives on Run Given
Chance to Peacefully Turn Themselves In (July 23, 2005), http://www.wkyc.com/
news/news_fullstory.asp?id=38311.
31
Trexler, supra note 4.
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trusted their minister the most. The minister is the one who is
there at birth, at marriages and at burials. They’re with the people every day, building trust. So I thought we could bring the
whole justice center and put it in a church and let the minister be
the advocate for the program and allow these people to surrender
32
in a comfortable environment.

Several cities have already completed the four-day program, including Cleveland, Ohio (pilot program); Phoenix, Arizona; Washington, D.C.; Indianapolis, Indiana; Akron, Ohio; Memphis, Tennes33
see; and Nashville, Tennessee. In addition, many other cities have
indicated their desire to launch the program in the near future, in34
cluding Atlanta, Georgia; Camden, New Jersey; Columbia, South
Carolina; Dallas, Texas; Detroit, Michigan; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Scranton, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia; Rochester, New York;
35
and Syracuse, New York.
A. Fugitive Safe Surrender Legislation
Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones (Ohio) and Senator
Mike DeWine (Ohio) introduced identical bills into the House and
36
Senate to authorize funding for the program.
President Bush
signed the bill into law on July 27, 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh
37
Child Protection and Safety Act. The bill allocates federal funding
to the U.S. Marshals Service in cities implementing the Fugitive Safe
Surrender program and provides $3 million for fiscal year 2007, $5
38
million for fiscal year 2008, and $8 million for fiscal year 2009. The

32

Id.
Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2.
34
Deborah Poritz, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, vehemently opposed the program and refused to allow state judges to participate in it.
See Graham, supra note 25. The program relies on participation by state judges because the fugitives involved have outstanding warrants issued by the state for state
crimes. See id. Poritz expressed two main concerns about the program: separation of
church and state and neutrality. Id. She was primarily concerned with what she believed to be a disregard for separation of church and state. Id. Secondarily, she asserted the importance of neutrality for courts and that participation by state judges
would seem like the courts were working for law enforcement and the prosecution.
Id.
35
Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion, supra note 6.
36
H.R. 5459, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2570, 109th Cong. (2006).
37
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 632, 120
Stat. 587, 641–42 (2006) (Fugitive Safe Surrender Act codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989
(West Supp. 2007)).
38
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2007).
33
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bill also states that the program should expand and eventually be39
come a national program.
Remarkably, the plain language of the bill, which entangles law
enforcement efforts, judicial responsibilities, and churches, reads:
(a) Findings. Congress finds the following:
(1) Fugitive Safe Surrender is a program of the United
States Marshals Service, in partnership with public, private,
and faith-based organizations, which temporarily transforms
a church into a courthouse, so fugitives can turn themselves
in, in an atmosphere where they feel more comfortable to
40
do so, and have nonviolent cases adjudicated immediately.
41

The program has received tremendous support in general, and
42
the bill easily passed in both the House and the Senate.
B. The Fugitive Safe Surrender Programs in Cleveland and Phoenix

43

Mount Sinai Baptist Church in Cleveland, Ohio, was the site for
44
the pilot of Fugitive Safe Surrender. On August 3–6, 2005, fugitives
were encouraged to voluntarily surrender themselves at church with a
rare opportunity to receive a “first and most crucial step toward
45
Radio, television, and outdoor companies
community re-entry.”
provided billboard space and airtime to promote the program and to
46
inform fugitives about the opportunity.
In addition, volunteers
posted and distributed more than three thousand fliers in the target
area and sent over two thousand mailers to fugitives’ last known ad47
dresses. Fugitives and their families could also call a toll-free hot-

39

Id. § 16989(a)(4).
Id. § 16989(a)(1).
41
See Bruce Wilson, New National Program to “Temporarily Transform Churches
into Courthouses,” Talk to Action (Oct. 29, 2006), http://www.talk2action.org/story/
2006/10/29/05334/588 (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
42
Tubbs Jones Announces Passage of Fugitive Safe Surrender Act as Part of Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 15, 2006.
43
Cleveland and Phoenix were the sites for the first two programs. See U.S. Marshals, Fugitive Safe Surrender, Phoenix, Arizona, http://www.usmarshals.gov/
safesurrender/phoenix.htm (last visited March 13, 2008).
44
See Kristin Anderson, WKYC News, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Cleveland Church
Gets Ready to Become Courtroom (July 24, 2005), http://www.wkyc.com/news/
news_fullstory.asp?id=38349.
45
Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2.
46
Press Release, U.S. Marshals Service, First-of-Its-Kind Program Gives Felony Fugitives Incentive to Surrender (July 26, 2005), available at http://www.usmarshals
.gov/district/oh-n/news/chron/2005/072605.htm.
47
Id.
40
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48

line for more information. Promoters advertised the program as a
community re-entry opportunity mainly for felons that had no history
49
of violence. While indicating that the program was not an amnesty
program, promotions and advertisements stated that the fugitives
who participated would receive “favorable consideration” for taking
advantage of the voluntary surrender opportunity and that the
50
church was a safe place for these fugitives to surrender.
One of the fugitives who participated was a thirty-three-year-old
man whose case was heard in the pastor’s office by Judge Janet Burn51
side. Judge Burnside provided favorable consideration by dropping
one felony charge in exchange for a guilty plea to a different felony
52
charge. The judge released the man on his signature and sched53
uled sentencing for the following month.
Public defenders assisted those who showed up at the church,
and non-profit organizations provided family counseling and child54
care services. A total of 842 fugitives surrendered during the four55
day pilot program, including 324 wanted for felony crimes.
Although the program targeted felons wanted for nonviolent crimes
with no history of violence, it provided assistance to anyone with an
56
The city planned a fugitive sweep to comoutstanding warrant.
mence immediately following termination of the pilot program, with
the intention of capturing fugitives choosing not to participate in the
57
program. The city would not provide favorable consideration to the
fugitives captured by the sweep the way it did to those taking advan58
tage of the program. The success of the pilot program led the U.S.
Marshals Service to announce its goal to implement the program na59
tionally.
Pilgrim Rest Baptist Church, in Phoenix, Arizona, was the site
for the next launch of Fugitive Safe Surrender on November 15–18,

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
WKYC News, supra note 28.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Wagner, supra note 28.
55
Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release, supra note 5.
56
See Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2; Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press
Release, supra note 5.
57
Anderson, supra note 44.
58
Id.
59
Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion, supra note 6.
49
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60

2006. Promoters advertised the Phoenix program the same way as
the Cleveland pilot program and also aired public service announcements featuring NBA star Shaquille O’Neal and Arizona Re61
publican Senators John McCain and Jon Kyl. Again, fugitives who
62
surrendered met with public defenders and Superior Court judges.
One hundred twenty fugitives surrendered during the first four hours
63
of the program.
These fugitives were wanted for crimes such as
drunken driving, disorderly conduct, failure to pay fines, and proba64
tion violations. In all, 1300 fugitives surrendered during the four65
day program in Phoenix. U.S. Marshal for Arizona David Gonzales
stated that fugitives would receive favorable consideration for participating, which “means they may be released without bail after appear66
ing at the church and may be given leniency later at sentencing.”
One of the fugitives in the Phoenix program was a thirty-two-year-old
man wanted for DUI, probation violation, and failure to appear in
67
court. He had one of his warrants quashed and was free to leave af68
The Phoenix program received a $600,000
ter the proceedings.
Federal Office of Justice Program grant for assembly and operation,
69
but Gonzales only expected it to cost approximately $75,000. In an
effort to publicize the program, the Maricopa County Superior Court
70
issued an administrative order to allow more media coverage. The
order lifted the forty-eight-hour advance notice requirement for
submitting a video-camera-in-the-courtroom request for any proceed71
ing that was part of the Fugitive Safe Surrender Program.

60

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Over 1,300 Fugitives Surrender to U.S.
Marshals at Church Site (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/
safesurrender/news/112106.htm [hereinafter Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release].
61
Wagner, supra note 28.
62
Jerry Seper, 1,300 Fugitives Give Up in Phoenix: Operation Seeks to Reduce Risk,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2006, at A4; see also Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra
note 60.
63
Wagner & Collom, supra note 26.
64
Id.
65
Seper, supra note 62.
66
Wagner, supra note 28.
67
Wagner & Collom, supra note 26.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
In the Matter of Cameras in Courtrooms for Fugitive Safe Surrender, Admin.
Order No. 2006-130 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa
.gov/SuperiorCourt/AdministrativeOrders/2006.asp.
71
Id.
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C. President Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative
Debate over federal funding for programs taking place in religious institutions is nothing new. Appropriation of federal funds for
use in churches has steadily increased since President George W.
Bush announced his faith-based initiative. During the second week of
his term, President Bush announced that promoting faith-based or72
ganizations would be one of his foremost legislative priorities.
The relationship between government and faith-based organizations has always been delicate. In 1996, Congress attempted to regu73
late this relationship by creating Charitable Choice.
Charitable
Choice was part of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 and was designed
to place religious institutions on equal footing with nonreligious in74
stitutions regarding government funding for social services. In addition, Charitable Choice provided that faith-based organizations
could not be required to alter their religious character in order to
75
participate in government-funded programs.
Bush’s faith-based initiative was his attempt to advance and en76
force Charitable Choice. Pursuant to his initiative, President Bush
established the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
77
Initiatives. The goal of the agency was to eliminate obstacles that
faith-based organizations faced in receiving federal funding for the
78
provision of social services. The agency succeeded in achieving its
goal as the amount of federal funding to faith-based organizations in79
creased dramatically.
Fugitive Safe Surrender requires that faithbased organizations receive federal funding in order to provide social
80
Therefore, this program
services to the fugitives who surrender.
falls under the umbrella of President Bush’s faith-based initiative.

72

Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2 (2005); Jill Goldenziel, Note, Administratively Quirky, Constitutionally Murky: The Bush Faith-Based Initiative, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 361
(2004).
73
Goldenziel, supra note 72, at 360 (citing Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000)).
74
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2000).
75
Goldenziel, supra note 72, at 361 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (2000)).
76
See Exec. Order No. 13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 12, 2002).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Goldenziel, supra note 72, at 364.
80
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007).
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III. FUGITIVE SAFE SURRENDER UNDER
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law re81
specting an establishment of religion . . . .”
The Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection from three main concerns:
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sover82
While Establishment Clause jurisprueign in religious activity.”
83
dence has evolved and become increasingly ambiguous, courts still
84
look at three tests as the guideposts in Establishment Clause cases:
85
86
87
the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test.
Courts “are free to apply any or all of the three tests, and to invalidate
88
any measure that fails any one of them.” Therefore, an analysis of
Fugitive Safe Surrender under Establishment Clause jurisprudence
must address these three tests.
A. Lemon Test
Despite heavy criticism, the Lemon test has never been overruled
and has consistently been used as the appropriate starting point to
89
analyze any program under the Establishment Clause. Most courts
still use the Lemon test, or some variation of it, as the main test to determine claims of Establishment Clause violations, particularly with
cases involving federal aid to sectarian organizations for secular ser90
91
vices. The Lemon test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, in which

81

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
83
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84
See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (analyzing
principles from all three tests to invalidate the school district’s policy of permitting
student led prayers before high school football games); Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328
F.3d 466, 485–87 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Lemon test, endorsement test,
and coercion test are the three tests that the Supreme Court uses to analyze alleged
Establishment Clause violations).
85
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
86
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
87
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
88
Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487.
89
See Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006).
90
See Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d 266, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2005); Mellen v.
Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2003) (endorsing the Lemon test as the
proper test for analyzing Establishment Clause issues, and incorporating the endorsement and coercion tests into the Lemon test as part of the second prong analysis); Gray v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 2d 795, 799 (W.D. Va. 2006).
91
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
82
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the Supreme Court analyzed two state statutes that provided state aid
to church-related elementary and secondary schools and teachers for
92
secular instruction. The Rhode Island statute provided for annual
salary supplements, up to fifteen percent, to teachers of secular sub93
jects in nonpublic elementary schools.
The Pennsylvania statute
provided for state reimbursement of nonpublic elementary and secondary schools for costs of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instruc94
tional materials in specified secular subjects. The Court in Lemon
established a three-prong test to analyze Establishment Clause claims:
95
the purpose prong, the effect prong, and the entanglement prong.
Violations of a single prong under the Lemon test means a govern96
ment action is unconstitutional.
1.

The Purpose Prong

The first prong of the Lemon test, the purpose prong, mandates
97
that the statute or program in question have a secular purpose.
This prong is not satisfied by the mere existence of a secular purpose
98
if the program is dominated by religious purposes. Under the purpose prong of the test, a court must ascertain “whether government’s
99
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” In order to
determine the purpose of a program, and thus to determine its secu100
larity, courts look at the face of the statute at issue, as well as at the
101
legislative history.
As Justice O’Connor explained, courts look to
the true governmental purpose, rather than just giving deference to a
102
While Justice O’Connor recognized that “[i]t
pretextual purpose.
is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham secular
purpose . . . . ,” she confidently proclaimed that “our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere
103
one . . . .”

92

Id. at 607–11.
Id. at 607.
94
Id. at 609.
95
Id. at 612–13.
96
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (“State action violates the
Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of [the Lemon] prongs.”).
97
Lemon, 403 U.S at 612.
98
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
99
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
100
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
101
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 n.100 (1982).
102
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75–76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
103
Id. at 75.
93
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Fugitive Safe Surrender is driven by a secular purpose: to provide fugitives a comfortable and safe place to surrender and to keep
104
arrests off the streets.
While the language on the face of the Act
about transforming a church into a courthouse could intimate a religious purpose, the Act further states that its goal is to provide fugi105
Moreover, the
tives with a comfortable atmosphere for surrender.
thin legislative history includes a speech by Senator DeWine, which
reinforces that the purpose of the program is to bolster public safety
by motivating fugitives to submit and keeping fugitive arrests off of
106
the streets.
Thus, there is insufficient evidence to argue a sham
purpose. Therefore, the program does not violate the first prong of
the Lemon test.
2.

The Effect Prong

The second prong of the Lemon test, the effect prong, requires
that the “principal or primary effect [of the program] . . . neither ad107
vances nor inhibits religion.” The inquiry is not whether the intent
behind the program is to inhibit or advance religion, but whether the
108
program has that effect regardless of intent.
The effect prong of the Lemon test has evolved and emerged as
the primary focus of cases involving governmental funding of secular
109
110
services provided by sectarian organizations.
In Agostini v. Felton,
the Court expanded the analysis under the effect prong of the Lemon
test in order to analyze governmental aid that was given to sectarian
111
schools. The Court also examined entanglement as part of this expanded analysis, rather than considering it as an independent prong
112
While the underlying question of the effect
under the Lemon test.
prong—whether religion is actually advanced or inhibited—remains
fairly simple, Agostini made the framework much more complex by
creating a new test subsumed within the effect prong of the Lemon
113
test.
The Agostini Court explained that, for determining whether
104

See Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2.
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
106
152 CONG. REC. S3231, 3231 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
107
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
108
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (internal quotations omitted).
109
See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
110
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
111
Id. at 234–35.
112
Id. at 232–35.
113
Id.
105
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governmental aid provided to sectarian organizations for secular services has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, a court must
use a three-part inquiry: whether the government aid (1) “result[s] in
governmental indoctrination,” (2) “define[s] its recipients by refer114
ence to religion,” or (3) “create[s] an excessive entanglement.”
a.

Government Indoctrination

Agostini’s first criterion, determining whether the government
aid results in governmental indoctrination, is “a question whether any
religious indoctrination that occurs . . . could reasonably be attrib115
uted to governmental action.”
The Court places most of the emphasis on neutrality in its attempt to discern religious indoctrination
116
The Court exthat can be attributed to governmental action.
plained that “[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike
eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the
117
behest of the government.” While acknowledging that neutrality is
an integral part of the analysis under this first Agostini criterion, Justice O’Connor expressed her concern that the Court placed too
much emphasis on this one factor, thus making it “a single and suffi118
Even prior to
cient test for the establishment constitutionality.”
Agostini, the Court began to lean heavily on the neutrality analysis,
119
giving it more weight than other Establishment Clause concerns.
As part of the neutrality analysis, a court should consider whether the government aid is provided to the sectarian organizations “as a
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 234.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 838 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 900 (Souter, J., dissent-

ing)).
119

See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). Bowen involved a claim that
the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 597.
The Act authorized grants to public and nonprofit private organizations, including
religious organizations for services and research in the area of premarital adolescent
sexual relations and pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-1–10 (1982). The Court upheld
the Act’s constitutionality, emphasizing its neutrality in including both religious and
secular service providers. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602. The focus of the Court’s neutrality
analysis in this case was on the organizations that would receive the funds. Id. Board
of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), involved
a state law that carved out a separate school district to serve exclusively a community
of highly religious Jews. Again, the Court focused on neutrality in finding that the
law violated the Establishment Clause partly because it singled out a particular religious sect for special treatment. Id. at 696. This case focused on neutrality in terms
of treating different religions equally. Id.
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result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individu120
Private choice “guarantee[s]
als” ultimately receiving the benefit.
neutrality by mitigating the preference for pre-existing recipients that
121
is arguably inherent in any governmental aid program . . . .”
Private choice was the primary focus of the Court’s analysis in
122
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
That case involved a Cleveland school
voucher program that gave financial assistance to families in Ohio
school districts who wished to send their children to participating
123
Ninety-six
public or private schools, including religious schools.
percent of the 3700 participating students enrolled in religious
124
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the program,
schools.
considering the true private choices of citizens to be of primary im125
portance.
The Court found that the federal funding was not sent
directly to the schools themselves, but rather was granted to individual families, who then made the choice to send their children to reli126
Therefore, the program allowed the students a prigious schools.
vate choice, without regard to their religious beliefs and
127
tendencies.
The Court drew attention to the three previous cases
in which claims of Establishment Clause violations were rejected primarily on the basis of the true and independent private choices by
128
These cases established that the proportion of
the beneficiaries.
120

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997));
see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993) (holding that
an interpreter provided by the government for a deaf child did not violate the Establishment Clause despite the fact that the interpreter would be interpreting religious
teachings because the material being interpreted was the truly private and independent choice of the child).
121
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810.
122
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
123
Id. at 645–46.
124
Id. at 647.
125
Id. at 652.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649–53 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397–401
(1983) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a Minnesota program authorizing tax deductions for various educational expenses because public funds were
made available to religious schools as a result of the truly private and independent
choices of the parents, regardless of the fact that the vast majority of beneficiaries
were parents of children in religious schools); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487–90 (1986) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a vocational scholarship program that provided tuition aid to a student
studying at a religious institution to become a pastor based on the independent private choices that determined where the money went, and once again deeming the
amount of government aid channeled to religious institutions by individual aid recipients to be irrelevant); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8–12
(1993) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal program that per-
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aid that ultimately reaches sectarian organizations is irrelevant as
long as the aid reaches those organizations as the result of the truly
129
private and independent choices of the individual beneficiaries.
Any advancement of religion would clearly be attributable to the in130
dividual, not to the government.
Further addressing concerns under the first Agostini criterion,
131
the Court in Mitchell v. Helms explored the argument that the mere
possibility of government funding being diverted for religious purposes is unconstitutional because it constitutes government indoctrination of religion. That case involved a challenge to Chapter 2 of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 (“Chapter
2”), a federally funded program through which educational materials
132
Under Chapter 2, the
and equipment are distributed to schools.
federal government distributed funds to states, which then channeled
them to state and local agencies that lent educational materials and
equipment to public, parochial, and secular nonprofit private
133
The Court was split on its analysis of the divertibility arschools.
gument. Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality, and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, argued that,
because the diversion of funds could not be attributed to government
indoctrination, divertibility was irrelevant so long as the government’s
intention was neutral and the aid was suitable for public schools
134
Justice Thomas
(meaning it did not include religious content).
reasoned that the content of the aid was the true concern, not divertibility, by explaining that “the prohibition against the government
providing impermissible content resolves the Establishment Clause
135
concerns that exist if aid is actually diverted to religious uses.”
The majority of the Court in Mitchell did not agree with the plurality opinion, particularly the plurality’s view that the Court should
136
not inquire into potential safeguards against such divertibility.
Justice O’Connor, writing a concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer,
rejected the idea that actual diversion of funding by religious organimitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools
based on the neutrality in determining the recipients of the aid and the true private
choice of allowing those recipients to decide where to direct the aid)).
129
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651 (citing Mueller, 474 U.S. at 490–91).
130
Id. at 652.
131
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
132
Id. at 801–02.
133
Id. at 802.
134
Id. at 820.
135
Id. at 822.
136
Id. at 837–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 903 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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zations is always constitutionally permissible.
O’Connor argued
that the plurality’s acceptance of actual diversion of federal funds for
138
religious purposes conflicts with existing Supreme Court precedent
and that such precedent “demonstrate[s] that we have long been
concerned that secular government aid not be diverted to the ad139
vancement of religion.” O’Connor further posited that the dispositive issue is whether there is merely the potential for divertibility of
140
funds for religious use or actual diversion of funds for religious use.
In order to make this determination, O’Connor said that good faith
should be presumed in the absence of evidence of actual diversion
and that pervasive monitoring should be abandoned so as not to lead
141
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor exto excessive entanglement.
plained that there should not be an absolute rule against potential
divertibility when the government aid consists of “instructional mate142
rials and equipment,” but distinguished the concerns raised by potential divertibility of aid in the form of cash. She supported this distinction by explaining that “the most important reason for according
special treatment to direct money grants is that this form of aid falls
precariously close to the original object of the Establishment Clause’s
143
prohibition.”
Justice Souter, writing a dissenting opinion in Mitchell, joined by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, argued that the possibility of divertibility should render a program unconstitutional unless appropriate sa144
feguards are in place to ensure that diversion does not ensue.
Determining whether Fugitive Safe Surrender has the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion requires examination of the federal
145
funding for the program under the Agostini criteria. Therefore, the
first question under the first Agostini criterion is whether the government aid for Fugitive Safe Surrender results in government indoctrination, or whether any indoctrination that may occur could be at-

137

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O’Connor explained that prior cases have shown that the Court has always been concerned about actual diversion of funds for sectarian purposes. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226–27 (1997); Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968)).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 855–57.
141
Id. at 857–60.
142
Id. at 856.
143
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 856.
144
Id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting).
145
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
138
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146

tributed to the government.
The funding is provided to the U.S.
Marshals Service in the city implementing the program and is used
147
Ultimately, the fufor preparing and implementing the program.
gitives are the beneficiaries, and while no fugitive is actually denied
participation because of his or her religion or lack thereof, fugitives
who are unwilling to go to church are constructively denied participation. Therefore, the aid is not provided neutrally because it does favor one group over another. Peter Elliot’s own comments indicate
that fugitives will be motivated to surrender because they trust their
148
ministers.
But this trust would not exist between Jews, Muslims,
atheists, or agnostics and the ministers at these churches.
Furthermore, there is no private choice involved with this program because the aid never passes through the hands, literally or fi149
guratively, of the fugitives before finding its way to the churches.
Therefore, the fugitives are not presented the opportunity to choose
whether the funding ultimately goes to sectarian or secular organizations. The choice is made for these fugitives that if they want to benefit from the governmental aid they must do so at church. Private
choice itself is not a constitutional requirement, but it is an important
150
While the
factor that the Court considers in its neutrality analysis.
Supreme Court has indicated that disproportionate use of funding is
151
irrelevant for determining neutrality, it has done so in the context
of funding that was directed by the private choice of the beneficiar152
ies. Therefore, the disproportionate use of the governmental aid by
Christians that is likely to result from Fugitive Safe Surrender is a major concern.
Turning to the issue of divertibility, the lack of uniformity by the
Supreme Court is apparent. Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion indicated that divertibility is irrelevant as long as the government’s intent
153
is neutral and the content is permissible, but this contention cannot apply to the current program. The permissible content requirement can only apply to government aid that is not in the form of
146

See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007).
148
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
149
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c).
150
See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810.
151
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993); see also
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651 (2002) (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 490–91 (1983)).
152
See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13–14; see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651 (citing Mueller, 463
U.S. at 490–91).
153
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802.
147
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money. Indeed, Justice Thomas’s discussion that diversion cannot be
an issue so long as the content of the aid is not religious involved only
154
cases in which the aid was not in the form of money. Furthermore,
Justice O’Connor explained that divertibility would be more discon155
certing when the aid is in the form of cash.
The federal aid here
consists of monetary aid, not aid such as instructional materials and
equipment. This distinction is crucial because aid in the form of instructional materials and equipment could not be diverted for religious purposes if the content is permissible. However, funding in the
form of cash creates significant concerns because it can easily be diverted for sectarian use, thus advancing religion. Therefore, Justice
Thomas’s interpretation of the divertibility issue is inapplicable to the
Fugitive Safe Surrender program.
Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the divertibility issue provides
that only evidence of actual diversion would make a program unconstitutional and that, absent such evidence, there should be a pre156
sumption of good faith. The infancy of the Fugitive Safe Surrender
program makes it difficult to discern whether there is actual diversion. Ordinarily, a presumption of good faith when the aid is in the
form of cash is a risky proposition because of the heightened danger
of divertibility. However, in the present case, monetary aid is provided from the federal government to the U.S. Marshals Service in
the state implementing the program. The U.S. Marshals Service then
uses the money to provide the necessary funds for the four-day program. Since the U.S. Marshals Service is a government agency with
no religious affiliation, it is reasonable to presume that this agency
will distribute the aid in good faith.
Under Justice Souter’s formulation of the divertibility issue, Fugitive Safe Surrender might be unconstitutional because no safeguards are implemented to ensure that actual diversion does not oc157
cur. However, the main safeguard is the fact that the aid is indirect,
first passing through the U.S. Marshals Service before it is provided to
158
the church.
This safeguard ought to be sufficient because, as a
154

Id.; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4; Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 487–90 (1986).
155
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 856 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
156
See id. at 855–57.
157
See id. at 908 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining his concern about divertibility
when no safeguards are in place to protect against actual diversion); see also supra
Part II.B (the description of the Fugitive Safe Surrender programs in Cleveland and
Phoenix notably did not mention the inclusion of any safeguards to ensure that
funds were not diverted for religious purposes).
158
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007).
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neutral government agency, it is unnecessary to monitor the U.S.
Marshals Service to ensure that no funds are provided for sectarian
use.
b.

Defining Recipients by Reference to Religion

Agostini’s second criterion significantly overlaps with the first because many of the same factors are applied and many of the same
159
questions are asked.
This criterion, like the first criterion, examines the neutrality and independent private choice involved, but to
determine whether the government has defined the recipients of the
160
funding by reference to religion. The Agostini Court explained that
a crucial part of this inquiry is whether the aid “creat[es] a financial
161
This financial inincentive to undertake religious indoctrination.”
centive is not present “where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is
made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a non162
discriminatory basis.”
Furthermore, a truly private and independent choice would indicate that the government has not provided any
incentive for the recipient of the funding to use it for religious pur163
This ensures that the government has not defined the reposes.
164
cipients of the funding by reference to religion. While the Court in
Mitchell explained that direct aid to sectarian organizations, which
does not literally pass through the hands of the private beneficiary,
can still be constitutional if it is directed to the organization of the
beneficiary’s independent choosing, it does create more of a concern
165
that the government aid will have the effect of advancing religion.
When analyzing a government aid case to determine whether
the government has defined the recipients of the aid by reference to
religion, it is necessary to pinpoint the primary beneficiaries because
these are the ones who must have access to the government aid in a
166
neutral and unbiased fashion.
To this end, the Court in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District dealt with a challenge to a federal program in which the government aided deaf children by providing sign-

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813.
Id.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
Id.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814.
Id. at 813–14.
Id. at 813–14, 818–20 & n.8.
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1993).
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167

language interpreters. James Zobrest, a deaf child aided by the program, chose to enroll in a Roman Catholic high school, meaning that
the government-provided interpreter would be interpreting religious
168
teachings. The Court said that the program’s primary beneficiaries
169
Therefore, the
were “[d]isabled children, not sectarian schools.”
Court upheld the program because the primary beneficiaries received aid based on neutral criteria and because the aid was directed
to the sectarian institutions at the behest of these primary beneficiar170
ies. Moreover, the Court determined that the number of interpret171
ers ultimately sent to religious schools was irrelevant.
Under the second Agostini criterion, the same factors that were
considered under the first—neutrality and private choice—are considered to determine whether Fugitive Safe Surrender defines its re172
This inquiry is predicated on
cipients by reference to religion.
whether the beneficiaries of the aid are presented with “incentive[s]
173
to undertake religious indoctrination.”
Based on the reasoning in
Zobrest, it is important to recognize that the primary beneficiaries
here are the fugitives. Fugitive Safe Surrender provides incentives for
the fugitives to undertake religious indoctrination in two ways: (1)
sending them the message that the church is saving them and (2)
merely getting them into church. First, the implicit message to the
fugitives that the church is saving them or giving them a second
chance is likely to restore faith in fugitives who lost it or create faith
in those who never found it. The fact that this pro-religion, and
more specifically pro-Christian, message is funded by the federal government is impermissible because it advances religion. Second, the
fact that the program occurs only in church provides an incentive for
fugitives to go to the church, and their presence alone provides an
opportunity for inculcation. The federal aid advances religion by giving churches this opportunity. While the government aid is allocated
for the benefit of all fugitives regardless of religion and is provided
on a nondiscriminatory basis, the program’s neutrality is significantly
compromised by the fact that it takes place only inside a church.

167

Id. at 4.
Id.
169
Id. at 12.
170
Id. at 13–14.
171
See id.; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651–53 (2002) (explaining that the “amount of government aid channeled to religious institutions by
individual aid recipients [is] not relevant to the constitutional inquiry”).
172
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 813 (2000).
173
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
168
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Therefore, Fugitive Safe Surrender fails under the second Agostini criterion.
c.

Excessive Entanglement

Finally, Agostini’s third criterion, excessive government entanglement with religion, was originally the third prong under the Lemon
174
test. The Agostini Court made this factor part of the analysis under
the effect prong of the Lemon test because “cases discussing excessive
entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as had
our cases discussing primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon’s
entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining
175
a statute’s effect.”
Excessive entanglement is discussed in the next
section of this Comment as the third prong of the traditional Lemon
176
test.
The only conclusion to draw from analyzing Fugitive Safe Surrender under the effect prong is that it has the effect of advancing religion by getting people into church and creating the opportunity for
the church to reach individuals it otherwise would not reach. The
program gets people into churches by running the program only at
churches. The Fugitive Safe Surrender Act uses the word “church” as
the location for the program and even says that running the program
in a church increases the likelihood of surrender because it provides
177
Morean environment where fugitives feel safe and comfortable.
over, all of the programs completed thus far have used a church as
178
the location for the program.
This has the effect of advancing
Christianity, even if that is not the intention, because many of these
fugitives may be Jews, Muslims, or simply nonreligious individuals
such as atheists and agnostics. These fugitives must accept the exposure to church or forego the opportunities provided by the program.
It is more likely that they will accept the exposure to church because
179
of the incentives provided in the form of favorable consideration.
This advances the church by giving ministers the chance to talk to
people they otherwise could not reach. In fact, in the Cleveland pilot
program, ministers acted as advocates for the fugitives who turned

174

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232–33).
176
See infra Part III.A.3.
177
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
178
See, e.g., Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release, supra note 5; Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ
Press Release, supra note 60; Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2.
179
See Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ, supra note 27.
175
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180

themselves in.
In addition, the fact that the church provides a second chance is likely to instill in these fugitives some sense of loyalty,
gratitude, or even indebtedness toward the church. Even though divertibility is not a concern because the funding is provided to the U.S.
Marshals Service, rather than the churches themselves, the second
prong of the Lemon test is violated because the program has the effect
of advancing religion. Therefore, Fugitive Safe Surrender is unconstitutional under the Lemon test.
3.

The Entanglement Prong

The third prong of the Lemon test, the entanglement prong, requires that the program “not foster ‘an excessive government entan181
glement with religion.’”
Originally, government funding created
an excessive and impermissible entanglement when the program in
question required “comprehensive . . . and continuing state surveil182
State surveillance or pervasive monitoring would be neceslance.”
sary if government funding could be used by the recipient to achieve
183
sectarian goals. Therefore, the federal funding would require “vast
governmental suppression, surveillance, or meddling in church af184
fairs” in order to ensure that federal funds are not used for sectarian purposes. The need for continuous observation in such a situation—to prevent sectarian use—constituted excessive entanglement
185
according to the Court in Lemon.
However, the Agostini Court modified the concept of excessive
entanglement in several ways. First, as mentioned previously, excessive entanglement became the third criterion under the effect prong
186
Secof the Lemon test and was no longer an independent prong.
ond, the Court became more lenient regarding permissible entan187
glement.
The Court expressed this leniency by stating that “[n]ot
all entanglements, of course, have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and
we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two.
Entanglement must be ‘excessive’ before it runs afoul of the Estab-

180

Russ, supra note 30.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n
of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
182
Id. at 619.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring).
185
Id. at 616, 620–21.
186
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997).
187
Id. at 233.
181

GRUEN (FINAL)

12/1/2008 12:43:58 PM

1556

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
188

[Vol. 38:1533

lishment Clause.” The Agostini Court continued by explaining that
administrative cooperation and political divisiveness, which once
were concerns under an excessive entanglement analysis, are no
189
Finally, the Court relonger concerns for excessive entanglement.
laxed the previous standard for pervasive monitoring by changing the
prior presumption that public employees will inculcate religion in a
sectarian environment and by adopting a presumption of good
190
faith. The presumption that public employees will act in good faith
eliminates the need for the state monitoring to be pervasive, which
191
means that the entanglement is not excessive.
Based on the current state of the excessive entanglement analysis
used by the Supreme Court, the main question posed by Fugitive Safe
192
Surrender is whether it would necessitate pervasive monitoring.
Even though the Agostini Court concluded that continuous state surveillance is no longer necessary due to the presumption of good
193
faith, this presumption was suggested in the context of aid that was
194
not in the form of cash. Therefore, the content of the aid could be
regulated, thus eliminating the need to monitor how the aid is used.
Here, the aid is in the form of cash, but it is provided indirectly—first
195
going through the U.S. Marshals Service and then to the churches.
This safeguard should be sufficient to ensure that, even if some monitoring is necessary, it does not reach the level of pervasive monitoring
because the U.S. Marshals Service has no incentive to siphon off
money for sectarian purposes. Therefore, the government would not
have to pervasively monitor the U.S. Marshals Service and its interaction with participating churches in each city implementing the program, which means there would be no excessive entanglement. This
does not, however, save Fugitive Safe Surrender from violating the
Lemon test, because the program still has the effect of advancing relig196
ion.
The analysis of Fugitive Safe Surrender under the Lemon test has
demonstrated that the program is unconstitutional. The first prong
of the test—the purpose prong—is not violated because the program
has the secular purpose of providing fugitives with a safe and com188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007).
See supra Part III.A.2.
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197

fortable place to surrender.
The second prong—the effect
prong—is violated because Fugitive Safe Surrender advances religion
198
The program is
merely by compelling fugitives to attend church.
also likely to advance religion by creating a sense of gratitude in the
fugitives toward the church for providing a second chance. The third
prong—the excessive entanglement prong—is no longer an independent prong of this test and, regardless, is not violated by Fugitive
Safe Surrender because the U.S. Marshals Service should be entitled
199
Even though this program has a
to a presumption of good faith.
secular purpose and does not require excessive entanglement, it fails
the Lemon test because a violation of a single prong, in this case the
200
effect prong, is a failure under the test.
B. Endorsement Test
The endorsement test was developed in Justice O’Connor’s con201
curring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly. That case involved a challenge
to Pawtucket, Rhode Island’s inclusion of a crèche, or nativity scene,
in the city’s Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit organi202
Justice O’Connor exzation located in the shopping district.
plained that “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s
203
She expressed her concern
standing in the political community.”
that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
204
The question becomes whether an objective observer
message.”
would perceive the state’s action as endorsement of a particular relig205
ion. Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the “objective observer” de206
scribes an individual with knowledge on the subject and the laws.
In addition, practices that endorse or disapprove of religion, “in real207
ity or public perception,” violate the endorsement test. The endorse197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part III.A.3.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 690.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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ment test has been embraced by the majority of the Supreme Court
208
as a way to analyze Establishment Clause cases.
Justice O’Connor also noted that mere government acknowledgement of religion is not equivalent to government endorsement
209
of religion.
She explained that practices such as legislative
210
prayers, printing of “In God We Trust” on money, and opening
court sessions with “God save the United States and this honorable
court” would constitute acceptable government acknowledgement of
211
religion. Justice O’Connor supported this position by explaining
that these practices constitute government acceptance of religion,
rather than government endorsement, because of their lengthy his212
tory.
The Agostini criteria discussed previously for determining whether government aid advances or inhibits religion are also used to determine whether aid endorses or disapproves of religion under the
213
endorsement test. To this end, the Supreme Court recognized that
“no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private
choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of
the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries
214
with it the imprimatur of government endorsement.”
An “objective observer,” as formulated by Justice O’Connor,
would recognize that Fugitive Safe Surrender offers a safe and com215
fortable environment for fugitives to surrender, a benefit that is not
shared by fugitives of all religions. Therefore, non-Christian and
nonreligious fugitives would not feel as comfortable as Christian fugi216
The
tives surrendering in a church, a Christian place of worship.

208

See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301–10; see also McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844, 865–66 (2005) (holding that displays of the Ten Commandments in
courthouses violated the Establishment Clause).
209
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
210
Id. at 693 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
214
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654–55 (2002).
215
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
216
Though not the focus of this Comment, it is important to note that the Fugitive Safe Surrender program may also violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which declares that “[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. While the program does not deny its benefits to any person on its face, the effect of having the program in the church may deny the benefits
to certain groups of people. This program would most likely be subject to rational
basis review, meaning that the state would need to show that the program has a ra-
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program is biased toward those who feel comfortable in a Christian
217
An objective observer would also recognize that the
institution.
218
program offers “favorable consideration” to its participants. Providing favorable consideration—such as release without bail, quashing
219
warrants, and sentencing benefits —to fugitives willing to enter a
church sends a message of government endorsing religion. In particular, the government sends a message of endorsing Christianity,
while disfavoring other religions, by using only churches for the pro220
Furgram rather than also using Muslim or Jewish sanctuaries.
thermore, the program creates the public perception of endorsing
religion by involving members of the judiciary branch of government
(state judges) and having them perform services inside a house of
221
worship (the church).
As Chief Justice Poritz of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey warned, this eliminates the perception of neutrality in the judicial system and gives the appearance of judges work222
It also creates the appearance that the
ing for law enforcement.
judicial system is working for, or at least in conjunction with, religious
houses of worship, and only Christian ones at that.
Fugitive Safe Surrender further violates the endorsement test
because, under Agostini, the federal aid provided for the program
223
creates the perception of endorsing religion.
As analyzed previtional basis to a legitimate state purpose. See generally Ry. Express v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
217
Jon Levine and Richard Moreland, psychology professors at the University of
Pittsburgh, have conducted extensive psychological research on groups and behaviors in groups. Their research indicates that out-group members feel uncomfortable
when infiltrating groups and that conflict can exist when out-group members attempt to infiltrate an existing group. See Jon Levine & Richard Moreland, Progress in
Small Group Research, in 41 ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 585 (1990). This research
suggests that non-Christians (out-group members to the Christian community) would
feel uncomfortable infiltrating the Christian community, which leads to the conclusion that these out-group members are less likely to take advantage of the Fugitive
Safe Surrender program than Christian in-group members.
218
Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ, supra note 27.
219
Wagner, supra note 28; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26.
220
No mention is made in the act about using Jewish or Muslim places of worship
for the program. Only the word “church” is used. 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West
Supp. 2007). Additionally, the programs completed thus far have used Christian
churches.
See U.S. Marshals Service, Fugitive Safe Surrender, http://
www.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/expansion.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008)
(Listed on the left side of the home page are several links for descriptions of the cities in which the program has been instituted so far. Descriptions of each individual
program, including the Christian churches used by the program, are available
through the link provided in the name of the individual city.).
221
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1); Graham, supra note 25.
222
Graham, supra note 25.
223
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
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ously, Fugitive Safe Surrender does not involve private choice and is
224
constructively partisan toward religion, specifically Christianity. For
the same reasons that the governmental aid advances religion, it also
causes the reasonable observer to believe that government has endorsed religion.
An argument that Fugitive Safe Surrender merely acknowledges
religion would be tenuous because this line of reasoning hinges on
225
the practice having a lengthy history, and Fugitive Safe Surrender is
new. In addition, the practices accepted as mere acknowledgement
of religion recognize the existence and observance of religion in
226
general but do not endorse one particular religion over another.
Fugitive Safe Surrender, on the other hand, endorses one religion
over others by providing its benefits primarily to individuals that feel
the most comfortable in churches, presumably Christians. This cannot be explained as mere acknowledgement of religion. Therefore,
the Fugitive Safe Surrender program endorses religion and violates
the Establishment Clause under the endorsement test.
C. Coercion Test
227

The coercion test was developed in Lee v. Weisman. Due to the
coercive nature of the religious activity, the Lee Court invalidated a
school’s practice of inviting a member of the clergy to deliver a non228
sectarian prayer at a commencement. The Court stressed that “at a
minimum, the constitution guarantees that government may not co229
erce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”
The Court determined that, while attendance at the graduation
ceremony was technically voluntary, the children’s only option to
avoid the coercion was not to participate in the graduation ceremony,
230
thus missing out on its benefits. Though an individual’s decision to
participate in a particular religious exercise may be voluntary, courts
have determined that compelled attendance at a ceremony or function in which exposure to religion is unavoidable will violate the co231
ercion test.
Therefore, compelled or pressured exposure to gov224

See supra Part III.A.2.a–c.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
226
See id.
227
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
228
Id. at 590.
229
Id. at 587.
230
Id.
231
See id.; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (striking
down a policy that authorizes a school’s student body to vote on whether an invocation would be delivered at its football games). The Court in Santa Fe indicated that
225
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ernment-sponsored religious activity presents the dangers that the Es232
tablishment Clause was intended to prevent.
Neither the fact that prayer may be denominationally neutral nor
the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary
can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause . . . . The Establishment Clause . . . does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by
the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or
233
not.

Based on the analysis under the coercion test, Fugitive Safe Surrender is not voluntary because fugitives are compelled to attend the
church in order to receive the benefits of the program. As previously
234
discussed, the program offers “favorable consideration,” which includes release without bail, quashing warrants, and sentencing bene235
fits.
Therefore, fugitives who wish to avoid religious exposure
could not participate in the program and could not attain these substantial benefits. Furthermore, at the conclusion of both the Cleveland and Phoenix programs, the respective cities conducted a sweep
236
to capture fugitives who chose not to participate in the program.
The fugitives captured by these sweeps did not receive the favorable
237
consideration that the programs’ participants did.
This further
demonstrates the coercion because fugitives choosing to avoid religious exposure might be captured and receive harsher penalties than
if they submitted to the religious exposure. Like the children in Lee,
fugitives have to deny themselves of the program’s substantial benefits if they wish to avoid exposure to religion.

while attendance at football games was technically voluntary, there was “immense social pressure” to attend and not attending to avoid exposure to religious worship
would deny the individuals the benefits of being at the game. Id. at 311–12; Warner v.
Orange County Dep’t of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1069 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
coerced participation in religion-tinged AA meetings violated the Establishment
Clause); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 473–74 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that coerced
participation in religion-tinged NA meetings violated the Establishment Clause).
232
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985) (invalidating a statute mandating a moment of silence in the public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1962) (striking down a school board policy
that required daily recitation of a prayer in the state’s elementary and secondary
schools).
233
Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
234
Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ, supra note 27.
235
Wagner, supra note 28; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26.
236
Anderson, supra note 44; Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra note 60.
237
Anderson, supra note 44; Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra note 60.
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Moreover, a finding of coercion does not require a finding of
required participation in religious worship or activity; mere exposure
or compelled presence at religious exercises will suffice to establish
238
coercion.
Participants of Fugitive Safe Surrender are coerced into
exposure to religious practices, or at the very least, religious symbols,
expressions, and connotations. Some of the programs have further
increased coercion by having ministers act as advocates for the fugi239
Not only might fugitives of other religions or non-religious
tives.
fugitives feel uncomfortable with ministers as their advocates, but if
the fugitives are not Christians this could affect the ministers’ zeal in
their role as advocates. Fugitives in this position are more likely to
submit to inculcation and are more susceptible to coercion because
of their precarious situation. This “uniquely susceptible” position
further compromises the fugitives’ freedom to avoid religious expo240
Individuals should not be “requir[ed] . . . to alienate themsure.
selves from the . . . community in order to avoid a religious prac241
tice.”
Fugitive Safe Surrender violates the coercion test because
fugitives must face coerced exposure to religion in order to participate in the program.
D. Public Policy Concerns
The Supreme Court has accorded some weight in its Establishment Clause analysis to the notion that a program successfully ad242
dresses a pressing social need or public policy concern.
For example, the majority opinion in the Zelman decision focuses at length on
the magnitude of the crisis in the Cleveland school system, and suggests that the voucher system is an innovative and successful solution
243
to the problem.
Justice Souter, in his dissent in Zelman, implied

238

See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Court determined
that a practice in which all cadets and midshipmen at military academies were required to attend Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish chapel services on Sundays violated
the Establishment Clause because government may not require an individual to engage in religious practices or to be present at religious exercises. Id. at 284; see also
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003). In Mellen, although the claim failed
due to qualified immunity, the Court said that a practice in which students at a military school were not required to pray but were required to be present at a mandatory
supper prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 360.
239
Russ, supra note 30.
240
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371.
241
Id. at 372 n.9 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
242
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
243
Id. at 643–46 (majority opinion).
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that the majority is in fact motivated by such public policy concerns
in their decision:
The record indicates that the schools are failing to serve their objective, and the vouchers in issue here are said to be needed to
provide adequate alternatives to them. If there were an excuse
for giving short shrift to the Establishment Clause, it would prob244
ably apply here. But there is no excuse.

From a public policy perspective, Fugitive Safe Surrender does
cure a pressing social need. The success of the pilot program in
245
246
Cleveland, as well as the success of the Phoenix program, demonstrates the program’s ability to respond to the social concern of securing the capture of fugitives in a safe fashion and limiting crime.
However, as Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in Zelman, there
is no excuse for leniency with respect to the Establishment Clause,
even for a truly beneficial purpose, and if violations are allowed because they help to cure societal ills, then even greater societal ills are
247
created.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING FUGITIVE SAFE SURRENDER
While violating some important principles in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, Fugitive Safe Surrender also presents an innovative way to correct a societal concern. Therefore, the program
should not be abandoned but should be improved to make sure that
its benefits are realized by society while separation of church and
state is maintained.
Rather than providing fugitives with this opportunity at church,
Fugitive Safe Surrender should provide this opportunity at community buildings with little or no religious affiliation and where all religious and irreligious people feel equally comfortable. For example,
the program would succeed in a public library or a local YMCA. Despite actually being a “Young Men’s Christian Association,” and thus
having some religious affiliation, a YMCA does not bear the same religious associations in a community as a church and is widely used by
people of all religions and no religion at all.
Offering the program in a more neutral community building
eliminates Establishment Clause concerns. No advancement of religion or excessive entanglement would ensue because this would not

244
245
246
247

Id. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release, supra note 5.
Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra note 60.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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increase the number of people present in church and there could be
no diversion of governmental funding for sectarian use. There would
be no endorsement of religion because a reasonable observer would
not perceive the program as promoting one religion over another or
as promoting religion generally. This would also eliminate coercion
because fugitives would not be forced to expose themselves to church
in order to participate. Meanwhile, the program would still provide a
successful solution to an important problem because the intended
benefits of the program—providing fugitives an environment to surrender where they feel safe and comfortable and keeping fugitive arrests off the streets—would be accomplished.
This alternative would still need to address the concern that the
program may compromise the unbiased appearance of the judiciary
and give the impression that judges are working for law enforce248
ment. This was one of the concerns expressed by former Chief Jus249
tice Poritz when she considered the program for New Jersey.
Measures should be taken to ensure that fugitives are aware that
the judges are not working for law enforcement, are completely neutral, and are simply there to assist the fugitives. For example, the intense advertising campaign for the program could include assurances
that the program is meant simply to move these proceedings to a
more fugitive-friendly environment and that these judges are agreeing to move from the courthouse to the community center for that
purpose. In addition, at the proceedings the judges themselves could
make sure to stress to the fugitives that they are not working for law
enforcement or taking sides. As long as the fugitives understand the
distinct roles played by all parties involved, the program can flourish,
and one of this country’s most vital principles—ensuring that Congress and state legislatures do not make any law respecting an establishment of religion—can be securely protected.
V. CONCLUSION
While Fugitive Safe Surrender is a novel program that provides a
benefit to society, it is vital to use caution when interaction between
religion and government exists. The government creates a slippery
slope when it uses constitutionally suspect means to achieve a goal—
no matter how commendable the goal. Where is the line drawn? In
the words of Thomas Jefferson: “History I believe furnishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government.
248
249

Graham, supra note 25.
Id.
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This marks the lowest grade of ignorance, of which their political as
well as religious leaders will always avail themselves for their own pur250
pose.”

250

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron von Humboldt (month, day 1813), in
THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 370, 370 (George Seldes ed., Citadel Press, 1983).

